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ABSTRACT 
During the late 1960s congestion of ten leading to long delays was common 
at major U.S. airports. To handle this problem the FAA set quotas on the 
number of flights per hour, and the CAB established committees of airline 
representatives to allocate the scarce landing rights among competing 
carriers. Currently the committee process has become a focal point of 
controversy: industry spokesmen have advocated that the system be expanded 
nationwide to handle developing congestion problems while others have 
attacked the committee process as being possibly anti-competitive and thus 
inconsistent with the goals of airline deregulation. This paper contains 
a description of the coDBDittee process, a theoretical model of the process, 
an analysis of the economic efficiency of the process, and a suggested 
alternative mechanism. 
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During the late 1960s, air congestion often involving long delays or 
"stacks" was common at major airports. The right to land and take off was 
allocated on a first-come, first-served basis with little coordination among 
scheduled carriers. Since 1968, the four major airports in the United States, 
La Guardia, Washington National, John F. Kennedy International, and O'Hare 
International, have been operating under a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
high-density ruling which limits the number of slots (takeoffs and landings per 
hour) at each of these airports. 
Slots are allocated by scheduling committees authorized by the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB). The scheduling committee at each airport is comprised 
of one representative from each airline certificated by the CAB to fly into that 
airport. The committees usually meet semiannually, as organized and coordinated 
by the Air Transport Association. Membership on the committees is relatively 
stable, with the same person usually being on all committees on which a carrier 
has representation. 
Tite implications of the committee method of allocating airport capacity 
are a current pol icy concern. By 1985, as many as thirty-five airports may be 
facing serious access or capacity problems. In addition to runway, airspace, 
and environmental constrnints, bottlenecks could be caused by loading facilities, 
baggage facilities, counter space, etc, Industry sources have advocated the 
colllmittee process as a national solution to the associated allocation problems, 
An analysis of the committee process relevant to policy makers must 
overcome two difficulties. First, key data about flight and route profitability 
will not be released by the carriers. Second, because of recent changes, the 
performance of the process in the past cannot simply be extrapolated to the 
future. Prior to deregulation, entry was effectively blocked, so the committee 
needed only to coordinate a few large carriers with relatively stable shares, 
However, with deregulation the committee must deal with entrants that seek to 
alter shares, 
In order to deal with these problems, we studied such data as are 
available, and attended four scheduling committee meetings. In addition, we 
conducted several series of laboratory experiments. 1 The committees studied 
made decisions using the same procedures as do the scheduling committees. Sub-
stantial financial incentives were used to induce demand functions which had the 
same qualitative properties as are thought to characterize the demand functions 
for slots. The experimental work graphically demonstrates that the model upon 
which the analysis is based has empirical support. This type of evidence will 
probably be of little value to economists who already have considerable experience 
with the behavioral properties of a variety of allocation processes. The model is 
typical of those which are often applied, so most economists will not be surprisPd 
to see it work in a simple laboratory environment. Nevertheless, as committee 
processes sometimes have subtle properties, it does not hurt to check the reliabil-
1ty of the basic reasoning, Furthermore, some decision makers may have no 
experience with game theoretic models, and rely on instincts and general theories 
o[ a completely different sort. To the extent that they may have doubts about the 
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generality of the economic models, additional experiments can always be conducted 
which incorporate the variables of their concern. 
I. THE HODEL 
The model applied to evaluate the coDD11ittee process is the core of a 
cooperative unanimity voting game without side payments. Game theoretic models 
seem to provide the appropriate tools. It seems fair to say that members of the 
committee are aggressive defenders of their companies' interests and view the 
committee as a complicated bargaining process in which they apply all their 
negotiation skills. The value of a slot during peak hours could be worth hun-
dreds of dollars a day. Members of the coDD11ittee are gener;lly individuals with 
important management positions within their companies and most have several years 
experience on the committee, 2 Evidence of strategic maneuvers is abundant, 
The rule of unanimity captures much of the essence of the coDD11ittee 
procedures. While the procedures used by the committee were not detailed in the 
order creating the committees, members were told to reach an "agreement. " Thie 
has been interpreted as a basic rule of unanimity. In the past, the committee 
has always achieved unanimity and the FAA has always approved the decision, Aside 
from the rule of unanimity, the committee has adopted additional procedures. Prior 
to each meeting the members submit their requests for slots to the committee 
staffs. Not surprisingly, requests for slots usually exceed the FAA quotas at 
least for peak periods of the day. Host of the meeting is spent in discussions 
among carriers and with the chair, which result in reducing the number of requests 
to equal the number of slots available. "Sliding," a procedure whereby a carrier 
moves n request for operation from one hour to another, frequently occurs. 
Hypotheticnl 11exercises11 are o[ten used, with carriers constrained to the 
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individual totala of SOlll! previous (typically the last) meeting or some other 
hypothetical schedule. Exercises, when complete, are usually a feasible solution 
which can serve as a basis for further discussion or a proposal to be voted on. 
The institutional structures of the committees are designed to prevent 
side payments and generally induce a voting nature to the allocation process as 
opposed to a market nature, The committees are exempt from antitrust laws. 
Nevertheless, concern about potential anticompetitive effects of the committee 
operations led the CAB to limit the scope of the conunittees' activities, Each 
scheduling co111nittee meeting is limited to discussions about slot allocations 
at a single airport for a fixed period of time. Discussions of city-pairs, 
scheduled fares, profitability, and other general aspects of airline competition 
are explicitly prohibited. Thus, for example, a committee member in the process 
of bargaining for an additional slot, may not mention the intended destination or 
point of origin. These restrictions make it difficult if not impossible for the 
airlines to trade slots either across the high density airports or over time. 
Side conversations can take place but the public nature of the bargaining 
situation would make any "under-the-counter" sales of slots difficult. Carriers 
have no property rights in slots and do not have the contractual authority to make 
sales or trades, Carrier A may be willing to pay carrier B for slots, but if B 
were to reduce its slots, some other carrier (not A) may end up with them through 
the committee process. Thus, the institutional features suggest a game without 
side payments. 
In all such models the core of the game is substantially influenced by 
the consequences of default--the option that would prevail if the committee failed 
to reach an agreement. No carrier would accept an allocation which it prefers 
less than the default option (sometimes called the "threat point" in game theory). 
Each member has the power to "block" group action and force the committee into 
default. Titerefore, the final outcome must be at least as good as the default 
option for all members of the committee, 
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Should the committee fail to reach agreement, the decision would rest 
with the FAA. The procedure the FAA would use in the event of a default has not 
been decided. Four possibilities for allocating slots have been discussed: (1) a 
lottery; (2) an auction; (3) grandfathering slots according to historical patterns; 
(4) an administrative process of reviewing applications and applying some formula. 
No indication has been given by the FAA of its preference among these options, but 
carriers are not indifferent. The higher the likelihood that the FAA would grand­
father slots, the less large established carriers would fear default. The higher 
the likelihood of a lottery or of the FM giving slots to potential entrants, the 
less potential entrants would fear default. 
JI, ALL OCATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
An important implication of the model introduced above is that the 
allocations of slots within the committee processes are sensitive to the regula­
tory political climate, The consequences of default depend upon the decisions of 
the FAA which will certainly depend on the political climale at the time of default, 
Thus, the evaluations of the default option which are crucial from a resource 
allocation perspective depend in part upon political considerations. 
1, Efficiency Properties of Committee Decisions 
Allocations which result from committees using procedures such ss those 
used by the slot committees need not be economically efficient allocations. The 
primary variable which guides the committee decision is the threat point (conse­
quences of default), and given its determinants, the outcomes will be economically 
efficient only by accident. This general conclusion applies both at the 
independent committee level and at the "systems" level. 
1.1 Efficiency at the Single Co11111lttee Level 
The pattern has been for the new carriers to receive a few slots at the 
expense of carriers with a large allocation of slots, Aside from this small alloca-
tion at the time of entry, individual carriers have experienced little growth. This 
is understandable. Suppose the grandfather policy was �dopted, The model predicts 
that expansion or entry could only take place if the historical time-of-day pattern 
was so inefficient that some carriers would prefer to give up a few slots to 
entrants rather than forgo the gains from trade that an entrant-induced default 
would cause. Thus, for practical purposes entry and expansion would be prevented. 
Alternatively, if a lottery were adopted, carriers could anticipate only the ex-
pected value of the lottery. Presumably this would be the number of slots divided 
by number of requests where "requests" are subject to some review to avoid the 
obvious unbounded strategy. Without further qualifications this would mean that 
each carrier would expect the same number of slots. The slot committee would thus 
unanimously choose equal division with the largest holders forced to "give-up" 
slots to smaller firms and entrants, 
This pattern is easily seen in the experimental research. Eight 
(fourteen member) and ten (nine member) committee experiments were conducted with 
the grandfather default rule. The "historical shares" of slots across members 
ranged from 0 to 8 with a total of 32 and 28 units to allocate respectively. 
Deviations of connnittee allocations from historical shares averaged only ,74 slots 
per individual per meeting and all of this is "large" holders giving up a few 
slots to very small holders. By comparison, three fourteen-member committees 
were studied under identical parametric conditions with the exception that a 
lottery rule would be used upon default, All participants received either two 
or three slots (expected value 2.5) which is exactly the case when agents are risk 
neutral. Average deviation from historical share was 1. 76 slots per member per 
meeting ? 
The current situation ls probably some mixture of these two. Thus, the 
largest firms should be unable to expand. In fact, the largest holders should give 
up slots to entrants. Entrants should obtain slots until they become dubious about 
the default option providing them with a reasonable expectation of more, 
Again the pattern is evident in the data from the controlled environment 
committees. Because the initial allocations need not be related to profitability, 
those who should expand cannot, In the controlled environment connittees, there 
were individuals in each size class that should have grown considerably. Growth 
was never achieved for large participants and large growth was never achieved by 
smaller, non-entrant participants where efficiency demanded it, Entry was always 
small and unrelated to underlying profitability, 
Inefficient carriers should contract in size. Certainly operations 
should not be transferred from more profitable applications to less. Yet the latter 
is what can happen within committee processes, In the experiments, for example, in-
dividuals who should have received no slots according to economic criteria always 
got them from the committee if the default consequences were favorable, 
Economics suggests discrimination among entrants, High cost carriers 
should not be granted scarce slots and enter the market when carriers with lower 
costs can enter or expand. Committee decisions on entry and exit do not follow this 
principle. There will be no exit since ca.rriers whose operations should be replaced 
by other carriers have no incentive to rel lnquish their slots. There will also be 
no discrimination among potential entrants based upon their relative efficiency. 
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All entrants have equal power to default the co111nittee and jeopardize the slots of 
those who have had many. Thus, with the cmmnittee, all potential entrants can "get­
in. " The experience of the controlled environment committees confonns to these 
predictions. 
Given a threat point, any allocation process should exhaust "gains from 
trade. " Generally speaking, the existing procedures are capable of dealing with that 
aspect of the coordination problem, The sliding operations systematically exploit 
the "gains from trade" from carriers trading operations at various times of day, 
The procedures are so natural that many controlled-environment committees initiated 
eliding operations even in the absence of their formal introduction, For the case 
of a "grandfather" default rule, efficiencies of committees that did not default 
always increased over the initial allocations in spite of inefficient entrants. 
The sliding process does have problems. The gains from trade between 
two parties can be prohibited by a third member (by virtue of the unanimity rule). 
Thus, a member who recognizes that two other members wish to trade can use the 
threat of veto to gain concessions. Committee members clearly recognized this 
possibility in controlled-environment committees, and it appears that members of 
the scheduling committees also do, 
1.2 System Level Efficiency 
The problem of efficiency goes beyond a single airport. The value to a 
carrier of a slot at one airport will generally depend upon the other airporta Lo 
which the carrier has access. For example, consider carriers entering a market. 
At a minimum this involves two airports, but because of joint costs and scale 
economies, entry into a "market" will frequentJy involve several airports. The 
allocation of slots within the system should he responsive to these interdependencies. 
The interdependencies among airports are clearly recognized by committee members. 
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The opportunity for some coordination across high density airports does 
exist. Even though discussion of city-pairs is explicitly precluded by the initial 
order, references are made to other meetings. Furthermore, the meetings for 
different airports are often convened "back to back". Nevertheless the process 
does not seem to deal efficiently with the interdependencies, An excellent example 
occurred recently when TWA waa willing to give up slots at O'Hare in order to 
increase its alots at National. United was interested in a "trade" but when 
other carriers heard slots at O'Hare might be "released" the requests for additional 
slots there increased accordingly and no deal was made. 
The nature of the problem is easily identified in the behavior of 
controlled-environment committees. For one series of experiments, payments 
were interdependent across two meetings, In general we found no evidence that 
controlled-environment conunittees were capable of dealing systematically with 
the system interdependencies. 
2. Responsiveness 
Since the committee decisions reflect primarily the consequences of de­
fault, they do not respond readily to changed economic conditions of individual 
carriers; indeed, they can be perverse. For example, if the profit position of a 
carrier increases, the optimum response in the committee can be to make concessions 
on marginal slots in order to "protect" its operations from a committee default. 
Thus, the finn would contract as it becomes relatively profitable rather than 
expand as it should. 
Hore importantly, carriers do not have an incentive to replace slots 
when they are "unneeded" because of short term, firm specific economics• Slots 
"released" and reallocated through the committee become part of the "historical 
share" of another carrier and thereby effect all future decisions. Even when 
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operations are not particularly profitable, firms have an incentive to keep them on. 
3, Susceptibility to Collusion 
Discussion of markets are strictly forbidden during committee meetings, 
City-pairs, prices, profits, etc, cannot be discussed, Yet, because of the 
co11111ittee structure each co11111ittee member has a type of control over competitors 
which is uncharacteristic of markets and inconsistent with the operation of a freely 
competitive system. Firms can influence the market shares among its rivals while 
leaving its own constant. 
As an eX811ple of these considerations consider the statement of Delta, 
a carrier whose position at Washington National has been very stable and thus 
has "given up" nothing to those who are expanding. 
DL: I've got some numbers I'd like to read off. Postmeeting January, 
1978, BN had 20. Postmeeting June 1978, BN had 20, Then 22, and 
after the meeting last summer, BN had 24. Now with four new 
carriers, BN asks for 4 more, all in overage hours. I don't know 
whether to say congratulations or shame. I don't intend to let 
BN get away with this. I've got people who ask me about slots not 
being used, I explain that it's a voluntary thing, in good will. 
But it's harder to explain why we don't get any. I can't explain 
how a carrier can go from 20 to 28 [emphasis added]. (Grether, Isaac, 
Plott 1979, Appendix C) 
This quotation from Delta is not atypical of concerns carriers articulate 
about the general slot distribution, Frequently during meetings carriers will say 
they will reduce requests only after "others" (often named) have done so. Some-
times they are very explicit about who they feel should get what, 
4. Long Run Growth 
With the coamittee process, the value,of a slot does not serve as the 
means and the reward for creating additional airport capacity, Instead, the slot 
values are capitalized in the value of the recipient cnrrier companies. 
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The conunltlee allocation process will provide no stimulus at all for 
increasing airport capacity should the fiscal system fail to provlde adequate 
funds. Or, if airport capacity ls tu be supplied in response tu the economic 
demand for that capacity similar to the supply of other resources to the industry, 
then the cormnittee system cannot be an adequate mechanism. 
Ill RECOMMENDATION 
The CAB should remove the antitrust exemption of the colllJJittees. In 
place of the committee, we recommend the FM establish or seek legislation which 
would enable the establishment of one-price sealed bid auctions with aftermarkets. 
The timing of the auctions and the exact definition of a "slot" need further study, 
It may also be necessary to allow provisions for "contingent bids" to deal with 
possibly important complementarities and non-convexities. Revenues from the 
auctions should be used to relax capacity constraints. However, the exact inst!-
tutional method by which the latter, important recommendation can be implemented 
is left for further study. 
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1. For a more complete discussion see David M. Grether, R. Mark Isaac, and 
Charles R. Plott, "Alternative Methods of Allocating Airport Slots: 
Performance and Evaluation," prepared for the Civil Aeronautics Board 
and the Federal Aviation Administration (Pasadena, CA: Polinomics Research 
Laboratories, Inc. , 1979), 
2. Clearly this has implications for the cost of this process. Meetings are held 
twice a year with all representatives present, and last about one week although 
time required has been increasing. A full four weeks were required in 1979 
and most of this time was used in dealing with O'Hare and Washington National. 
3. Using the lottery and eight grandfather experiments with identical parameters 
one gets X2(6) = 22. 6 which is highly significant. For this analysis, classes 
are defined by historical shares. 
